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Abstract 
In this paper a fault recovery method for controlled discrete event systems is presented. It focuses on systems that are modeled by a class 
on Interpreted Petri nets which describes modularly the controller, the plant components, and the closed loop relationship. First, the notion 
of fault recovery is introduced, which is based on the state stability property. Then, a class of output tracking closed-loop model is 
described. Afterwards, a method for the synthesis of fault tolerant controllers based on the augmenting of the existing specification is 
proposed and illustrated with a case study from the manufacturing area.  
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
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1 Introduction 
On very recent years, the size and complexity of man-made systems namely computer networking protocols and automated 
manufacturing processes has been increasing at a very fast pace. Also, the importance of a robust implementation of those 
systems has become crucial for many aspects of our current lives. As technology advances, we are being increasingly 
surrounded by autonomous systems whose correct operation has a great influence on fundamental aspects like our own 
safety, or the huge losses related to manufacturing downtimes.  
In particular, the issue of developing systems that behave predictably and correctly under the occurrence of undesired and 
unavoidable events is of high importance. However, the size and complexity of current information systems has made this 
objective difficult and costly to reach, both in time and resources. For these reasons, we are interested in providing the 
systems the ability to recover from faults.  
This ability has been studied first by E.W. Dijkstra [1], who introduced the concept of self-stabilization, which has been 
proved to be a formal and unifying approach to fault tolerance analysis.  This work motivated research on fault tolerance on 
computer sciences [2][3][4] and automatic control [5][6] communities. 
Among these papers, a method for stabilization of discrete event systems was presented in [5]. The objective was to find a 
control law to guarantee convergence to a so-called legal state in a finite number of steps on a finite automata (FA) model. 
However, it neither considers that the control should enforce some plant behaviour in addition to stabilization, nor takes into 
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account the type of events (normal or abnormal). 
Recently, a similar approach was presented in [7][8][9]. While being also for FA, this work considered that the plant must 
comply with a specification in addition to state stability. Also, this work does not consider the uncertainty of event 
occurrence.  
In [10] the recoverability property was presented as a notion based on state stability. In order to look at event uncertainty it 
considers a distinction between normal and exceptional events like in [11]. Proposals in [12][13] tackle the issue of fault 
diagnosis on a class of Petri nets.  
In [14][15][16] and [17]-[19] the recovery problem is addressed through a controller reconfiguration approach for FA. 
Two operating modes (normal and degraded) are considered in [14][15][16]. Particularly, in [15][16] the authors proposed 
an integrated diagnostic/recovery architecture. The work presented in [17]-[19] approaches the problem relying on system 
redundancy. All of those proposals consider permanent faults that effectively limit system behaviour. 
In this paper, we are interested in faults that do not hinder the plant behaviour; in other words, the plant is still capable of 
complying with the nominal specification after fault occurrence. Our proposal is to augment the specification of an already 
controlled system in order to handle unavoidable events. Particularly, we consider closed loop systems modelled with a 
class of Petri nets (PN). PN have an advantage over FA in terms of system representation, in the sense that they can 
represent the same behaviour with a more compact and clear model, especially when concurrent tasks are dealt. Our 
proposal is based on concepts of [10], thus it also takes into account event uncertainty. 
The remaining of this paper is now outlined. Section II presents basic PN concepts. In section III the notion of fault 
recovery is presented. A class of closed loop systems modeled as Petri nets is described at section IV. Then, a method for 
synthesizing recovery sequences is presented at section V. Finally, concluding remarks are given and future work is stated. 
 
2 Background 
In this section basic notions and notation on PN and interpreted PN are overviewed. 
Definition 1: An ordinary PN structure G is a bipartite digraph represented by the 4-tuple G = (P, T, I, O) where: P = {p1, 
p2, ..., p|P|} and T = {t1, t2, ..., t|T|} are finite sets of vertices named places and transitions respectively; I(O) : P × T  {0,1} 
is a function representing the arcs going from places to transitions (from transitions to places). 
The incidence matrix of G is C = C+  C , where C  = [cij ];  cij  = I(pi, tj); and C+ = [cij+]; cij+ = O(pi, tj) are the pre-
incidence and post-incidence matrices respectively.   
A marking function M : P Z+ represents the number of tokens residing inside each place; it is usually expressed as an 
|P|-entry vector. Z+  is the set of nonnegative integers. 
Definition 2: A Petri Net system or Petri Net (PN) is the pair N = (G,M0), where G is a PN structure and M0 is an initial 
marking. 
In a PN system, a transition tj is enabled at marking Mk if pi  P, Mk(pi)  I(pi, tj); an enabled transition tj can be fired 
reaching a new marking Mk+1 which can be computed as Mk+1 = Mk + Cvk,  where vk(i) = 0, i vk(j) = 1, this equation is 
called the PN state equation. The reachability set of a PN is the set of all possible reachable markings from M0 firing only 
enabled transitions; this set is denoted by R(G,M0). A PN is called safe if Mk  R(G, M0), pi  P, Mk(pi)  1.  
Now IPN is defined, an extension to PN that allows associating input and output signals to PN models. 
Definition 3: An Interpreted Petri Net (IPN) (Q, M0) is a net structure Q = (G, , , , ) with an initial marking M0, where 
G is a PN structure,  = { 1, 2, ..., r} is the alphabet of input symbols i ,  = { 1, 2,..., q} is the alphabet of output 
symbols i,  : T  { } is a labeling function of transitions with the following constraint: tj,tk  T, j pi I(pi,tj) = 
I(pi,tk) (tj) ,  (tk) , then (tj) (tk);  represents a system internal event externally uncontrollable.  : 
R(Q,M0) {0,1}q is an output function, that associates to each marking in R(Q,M0) a q-entry output vector; q is the number 
of outputs.  is represented by a q×n matrix (where n =|P|), in which if the output symbol i is present (turned on) every 
time that M(pj)  (i,j)=1, otherwise (i,j)=0. 
If a transition tj  T of an IPN is enabled at marking Mk, there are two possibilities: a) If (tj) = i  is provided to the 
system then tj can be fired. b) If (tj) =  and tj is enabled then tj must be fired. When an enabled transition tj is fired in a 
marking Mk, then a new marking Mk+1 is reached. This behavior is represented as ; Mk+1 can be computed using 
the state equation given above and complemented with the output function: yk  =  Mk, where yk  (Z +)q is the k-th output 
vector (or marking projection) of the IPN.  
According to functions  and , transitions and places of an IPN (Q,M0) can be classified as follows. 
Definition 4:  If (ti)  the transition ti is said to be controllable. Otherwise it is uncontrollable. A place pi P is said to be 
measurable if the i-th column vector of   is not null, i.e. ( ,i) n-measurable. P = Pm  Pu where Pm is 
the set of measurable places and Pu is the set of non-measurable places.  
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3  Recoverability analysis of Petri net models 
In the occurrence of non-prevented events that detour the operation out of a given subset E of system states representing an 
expected behaviour, it is important to know if it is guaranteed that the system would eventually return to the expected 
behaviour.  
 
3.1 Stability analysis 
 
We understand fault recovery as a notion largely based on state stability, which has been studied in [5] for Discrete Event 
systems (DES) modelled with finite state automata. It is assumed that there is a predefined set of “good” system states E, 
such that, starting from these states and in the absence of errors or anomalous events, only desired event sequences are 
possible. A given state X is said to be stable if it does not exist a cycle of states, reachable from X, that does not have at 
least one state in E. A system is stable if every state in the system is stable. In this way, if errors or anomalous events are not 
very common, the system would exhibit legal behaviour most of the time. For that reason, state stability has been used to 
characterize fault tolerance/recovery. 
On the issue of verifying fault tolerance of a system, we proposed a further condition in addition to the stability property 
[10] related to the nature of the events required to occur in a recovery sequence. That is, if we consider that certain events 
do not occur as a part of the normal system behaviour (exceptions or faults), and one of those events is required to occur in a 
recovery sequence, even if a given state is stable it is not guaranteed that the system can go back to the nominal behaviour. 
In the next subsections, notions of state-stability and fault recovery are presented for PN-modelled systems.  
 
3.2 Stability and fault recovery of PN models. 
 
The state stability notion for DES modelled as PN is now presented. The expected behaviour is represented then by a set of 
markings, which can be leaved when an unexpected event occurs. 
Definition 5. Let (Q, M0) be an IPN system, and let E  R(Q, M0) be the set of expected markings. A marking M  R(Q, 
M0) is stable w.r.t. E if M is guaranteed to eventually reach at least one Me E by the firing of a finite length transition 
sequence. The system (Q, M0) is stable w.r.t. E iff  Mk R(Q, M0), Mk is stable w.r.t. E. 
The stability notion, as it was stated, is clearly not enough to guarantee that the states in E can be reached. Thus, a more 
detailed analysis must be done regarding the nature of events. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish between events that 
are expected to occur normally during the system operation (normal events: n) and events appearing rarely, e.g. faults 
(abnormal events: an) in the behaviour of the system; then an=  \ n. All the controllable events are normal; thus in 
general, an  u where u includes the uncontrollable events. In [12] a distinction of the events is similarly considered in 
the study of fault-tolerant controllers. 
Now, based in the new classification of events, the notion of recoverability is introduced. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Recoverability on PN reachability graph. 
 
Definition 6: Let (Q, M0) be an IPN, and E  R(Q, M0) be the desired marking set. A stable marking M* is recoverable 
w.r.t. E if there exists a firing sequence wk n* such that  , where M’  E.  
In other words, the sequences that lead to E from recoverable markings must not contain abnormal events; that is, recovery 
must not rely on events whose occurrence is rare or uncertain. A characterization of recoverability and an algorithm to 
decide the property are presented in [10]. 
The difference between the notions of state stability and recoverability are shown in Fig. 1. Markings M8 and M9 are not 
stable. Marking M5 is stable, but it is not recoverable because it requires the occurrence of an abnormal event to recover.  
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4  A class of Petri net systems 
IPN have been widely used for modelling concurrent discrete manufacturing systems. In this work, we focus our study on 
controlled DES whose closed-loop behavior is expressed by a class of IPN. In this class, the plant and the specification sub-
models are clearly distinguishable; also their interaction is clearly stated. 
More specifically, the control in this class of systems is dedicated to restrict the plant behavior to reach a sequence of 
outputs stated by the specification sub-model. This is achieved by enabling at each specification state those controllable 
sequences that allow the plant to reach the output expressed by the specification itself. When the plant output matches that 
of the specification, the latter is then enabled to proceed to the next output. The mechanism used to enable and disable 
events between the sub-models are the so-called self-loop arcs. A self-loop arc exists between place  and transition  if 
, = , = 1; a more explicit description is provided in Fig. 2. The DES class described before is called Output 
Tracking Closed-Loop Model (OTCLM), and is formally defined below.  
 
 
Fig. 2. General scheme for OTCLM 
 
Definition 7: Let ( , ) be an IPN. ( , ) is an Output Tracking Closed-Loop Model (OTCLM) if: 
a) It includes two clearly distinguishable sub-models ( , ) and ( , ), representing the specification and 
plant respectively. ( , ) is a safe strongly connected state machine. 
b) There exist self-loop arcs between ( , ) and ( , ) such that 
1. If there is a self-loop arc between  and , then   . 
2. If there is a self-loop arc between  and ,   is measurable.  
3. Let  and  with I( , )=1 (  is an input place for ). Then,  has self-loop arcs with a 
set of measurable places on  that represents the same output of . 
 
Notice that, whilst the desired sequence of outputs is given as a strongly connected state machine, concurrency is allowed 
on the plant, so, the complete closed-loop behaviour is more complex. 
 
5  A method for fault recovery 
Given an OTCLM system with a specification that does not include the handling of faults, the objective in this problem is to 
augment the closed-loop behaviour model to take into account unexpected occurrences of events, and consequently 
providing to the controller the ability to recover from faults. 
 
5.1 Problem statement 
 
Initially, two OTCLM are considered: ( , ) which represents the system faultless closed-loop operation, and 
( , ) which represents the system behaviour including the possibility of fault occurrence.  specifies the abnormal 
events in the system . For every fault, there exists a measurable diagnostic place that is marked after the 
eventual occurrence of the fault. This is because fault diagnosis is required for recovery although it is not part of our study. 
Additionally, we can unmark this place using a controllable event. The Set of expected markings is given by: =
( , ). 
The following assumptions are held for this study: 
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a) The plant sub-model ( , ) is safe when it evolves in closed loop behaviour. 
b) The occurrence of a fault eventually leads the system to deadlock state, by preventing the plant reaching an output 
required by the specification.  
c) One-fault at a time scenario is considered. 
 
5.2 Synthesis of the recovery sequence 
 
In order to present the technique for computing the recovery sequences, let us first introduce several useful notions. 
Definition 8: The set of markings susceptible to  is = { ( , ) | } ; they are the 
markings in which the occurrence of  is possible. The set of post-  markings is = ,
, }. 
 
Definition 9: The set of fixed-value places of  is = { | ( ) = ( ) , }; they are the 
places that invariantly have the same value on every marking susceptible to the fault . 
 
As an additional assumption, we consider the case where every place on the specification is fixed-value for every fault. This 
means that a potential fault may occur at only one state of the specification. The place of the specification where fault  can 
occur is represented by . 
 
Definition 10: Let ( , ) be a Petri net and ( , ) its generated language. A firing sequence  is called normal 
controllable if ( , ) , such that ( ) =  and every event in  is a normal event; denotes the 
prefix language of . 
 
Definition 11: A fault  is said to be recoverable if every marking, that is reachable after the occurrence of  and until 
returning to E, is recoverable. 
 
Now, we have the necessary concepts for developing a method for the synthesis of a fault recovery mechanism on 
( , ). In order to recover from fault , our approach consists of two steps: 1) first, we find a firing sequence that 
stabilizes the system from any post-  marking to an expected marking; then, 2) the specification is augmented to enable 
such firing sequence only after the occurrence of . The recovery sequence synthesis method for one fault is presented next. 
 
Step 1:Find a recovery sequence  
1.a) Define the partial markings: ( ) = 0( ) = + , where  is any marking in ,  is an 
unitary vector with entry corresponding to  equal to 1, and  is the incidence matrix of the faulty plant submodel. 
1.b) Solve the following linear programming problem. 
 min v  
 subject to: 
 1) ( ) +
,
= ( ),    . . ( ) ( ) 
       2) , = 0, . . ( ) = ( ) 
where 
,
is the , -entry of the faulty plant incidence matrix and = . 
1.c) Using the resulting firing vector , perform a partial reachability analysis to find a transition firing sequence , such 
that = . The obtained sequence w should be normal controllable; this condition can be checked at the 
moment of carrying out the reachability analysis. 
 
It is possible that, starting from , we are unable to fire the entire sequence. A clear example of this situation is when an 
unmarked place should be marked to enable a transition. A quick glance to step 1.a) reveals that those places which are not 
fixed-value ( ) remain unmarked ( ( ) = 0). This means that there are preconditions needed for recovery which are 
not guaranteed to hold in every marking susceptible to the fault.  
 
Step 2:Augment the specification model to handle a fault. 
2.a) In the closed loop model, every controllable transition already needs permission from some place of the specification. 
For this reason we need to duplicate those controllable transitions required to fire in . This will allow the firing of the 
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transitions on other places of the specification  
2.b) Add new transitions ,  and a new place  to the specification submodel; then add corresponding arcs such that  
, = 1, , = 1, , = 1. After that, add self-loop arcs between  and ’s diagnostic place 
and between  and the controllable transition used to clear ’s diagnostic place. Finally, add an inhibitor arc between 
 and ’s diagnostic place. 
2.c) Add a place-transition sequence to the specification that enables the recovery sequence starting with a place and ending 
with a transition. If  is the first place and  the last transition, we add arcs such that , = 1 and , =
1. Transition  should be enabled when the system marking is inside E, considering that the specification should be in 
. After the firing of , system should have recovered. 
 
Next, some results are presented to establish the correctness of the procedure presented here. 
 
Proposition 1: Let  be a fault. If a normal controllable recovery sequence  is found in step 1, then  can fire from every 
post-  marking. 
Proof:  By construction, sequence  can definitely fire from marking  (step 1.c ensures this). Marking  has a token 
only on those places which have a fixed-value equal to 1, with the notable exception of  preconditions (which had 1 in , 
but became 0 after  occurrence in step 1.a. Now, every post-  marking has the same fixed-values than (including 
preconditions because they are post- ). So, sequence  can be fired from any post-  marking.  
 
Proposition 2: Let  be a fault. The plant ends in a marking  after firing sequence  found in step 1, starting from 
any post-  marking. 
Proof:  Marking  (defined in 1.a) has the same values than any marking on  with the exception of the non-fixed 
value places. Now, the firing sequence , found on step 1, leads the plant to . Thus, we only have to prove that non-fixed 
values are preserved. In the case where  occurrence does not affect the non-fixed values, these will be zero both in  and 
, and after firing , these values will not change. Otherwise, if   occurrence of  changes non-fixed values, they will be 
zero in  but not in . Anyway, the sequence  is found in such a way that starts in  and ends in ; so, the non-zero 
values will be made zero after the firing of . This means that the non-fixed places will have the same value they started 
with, regardless if it was 0 or 1, because the recovery sequence removes a mark from a non-fixed place only if it had an 
extra mark by the effect of fault . Now, by Proposition 1, starting from any post-  marking the plant ends in a 
marking .  
Theorem 1: Let ( , ) be a faulty system and  one of the possible faults. After applying the method described 
before,  is recoverable. 
Proof:  By Propositions 1 and 2, we know that if a sequence is found at step 1, starting from any post-  marking, the 
system can reach an expected marking (  are Expected markings by definition) by the firing of sequence . Let  
be a post-  marking, and  be an expected marking such that . We make =  such 
that . We know that  is normal controllable, then  should enable controllable events 
and uncontrollable events which are normal and are included in . Because controllable events which are not in  can be 
disabled,  enables only normal events that are in , for any  possible. Thus, every reachable marking, 
starting from any post-  marking until returning to E is recoverable. Hence,  is recoverable.  
5.3 Example 
Consider the system depicted in figure 3. It is composed of three conveyor belts, a robotic arm, and an assembly machine. 
The desired behaviour of the system is the following: first, the robotic arm takes part A and part B from input conveyors and 
places them at machine 1. When both parts are placed, machine 1 assembles them into a finished product, which is 
withdrawn from the machine by the robotic arm to be placed on conveyor 3. 
 The Petri net model of the system is shown in Fig. 4. The desired output sequence is enforced by the specification; 
output A (B) represents that part A (B) is present at the input conveyor, outputs R1 and R2 are active when the parts are at 
the assembly machine and output R3 is active when the finished part is placed at the output conveyor. There is a transition 
labelled as f1, which represents the abnormal event of dropping part A before placing it at the assembly machine.  The fault 
free model can be obtained by removing transition f1. We have that: = { [0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0], [0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0] } where the shaded entries are the fixed places. The place of occurrence of f1 is R1R2 according 
to the previous markings. After applying step 1 of the method, we find that there exists a plant recovery sequence PA, GA 
which is normal controllable. After executing step 2, the resulting model is shown in figure 5. 
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Fig. 3. Assembly cell system 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Model of the assembly cell system 
Conclusions 
A method for providing fault recovery capabilities to controlled discrete event systems has been presented. The synthesised 
recovery sequences are added to the specification without modifying the original controller design; this feature is due thanks 
to the modularity of the models built using the PN class OTCLM, which additionally facilitates the syntheses of such 
sequences. Although the proposed method overcomes the previously published works on the matter given that it uses PN for 
a more compact representation and considers event uncertainty, further research can be done by exploring other PN classes, 
and for improving the efficiency of the method.  
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